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INFLUENCERS: NOT SO FLUENT IN
DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE
Keith Cooper *
The Fyre Festival is one of the most infamous disasters in music festival history. Lesser known to the public is that the influencers involved in
Fyre Festival’s influencer marketing campaign were required to disclose
their payments for endorsing the event. These types of disclosures are regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) pursuant to its authority
granted under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”). The disclosure requirement is set forth in the FTC’s Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (“Endorsement Guides”), which
are nonbinding instructions that educate influencers on how to comply with
Section 5 of the FTC Act.
While the FTC pursues companies and influencers that violate the disclosure requirements, its attempts are futile due to the Endorsement Guides’
nonbinding nature. With influencer marketing growing rapidly and fraudulent practices becoming rampant, the FTC must make two changes to become
more effective. First, the agency must use its rulemaking authority under the
FTC Act to codify elements of the Endorsement Guides, and other FTC
works into formal rules that will allow it to seek monetary penalties and consumer redress against violators. Second, the FTC must mandate disclosure
provisions to be present in every influencer-company endorsement contract
to prevent the prevalent deceptive business practice. By implementing these
two changes, the FTC will have adequate tools at its disposal to prevent and
punish violators who previously remained outside its grasp.

J.D. Candidate, 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like to, first and foremost, thank God for the blessings that he has provided. He would like to thank Professor Therese
Maynard for all of the guidance she has provided on this Note and his law school education. He
would like to thank the staff and editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for
their diligent work and feedback. Most notably, he would like to thank his grandparents, Roy and
Linda Cooper, and his parents, Keith Cooper and Shastin Angel, and the rest of his family for their
love and support.
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INTRODUCTION

In the early morning of April 27, 2017, “chaos” ensued on the sandy
beaches of the Bahamian Island of Great Exuma. 1 Recognized as one of the
most infamous events in music festival history, the Fyre Festival has been
the subject of numerous lawsuits stemming from a single disastrous weekend. 2 Festivalgoers were promised a luxurious experience of a lifetime,
which included “private planes, yachts, villas, wellness activities, free-flowing booze, and the chance of expanding their Instagram following by a few
thousand.” 3 Upon nightfall, anarchy ensued among the guests because there
was scarce food, electricity, lighting, or basic necessities. 4 To add to the
state of disarray, artists scheduled for the “two transformative weekends”
canceled days prior to the disastrous event, 5 leaving many attendees to speculate as to whether they were scammed.
Previously, in December 2016, Fyre Festival, Inc., attempted to make
a name for itself in the music festival scene and attract the attention of potential festivalgoers by launching its marketing campaign on social media. 6
The company was resilient in its marketing efforts, becoming heavily reliant
on “influencer marketing,” a growing area of advertising used to recruit

1. See Abby Ohlheiser, The Complete Disaster of Fyre Festival Played Out on Social Media for All to See; ‘Not My Fault’ Says Organizer Ja Rule, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017, 11:50
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/04/28/the-complete-and-utter-disaster-that-was-fyre-festival-played-out-on-social-media-for-all-to-see/
[https://perma.cc
/H55K-NP2E].
2. See Jack Garson, How to Be an Influencer and Not Get Sued, FORBES (May 7, 2019,
4:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackgarson/2019/05/07/how-to-be-an-influencer-and-notget-sued/#786876bf645a [http://archive.today/r7kzl].
3. Margaret Abrams, What is Fyre Festival? Guests Who Got Scammed by Billy McFarland
Tell Their Horrifying Stories, EVENING STANDARD: INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.standard.co.uk/insider/alist/fyre-festival-what-happened-a4039896.html
[https://perma.cc/7AUFB49N].
4. See Ohlheiser, supra note 1.
5. See id.
6. No, Fyre Festival Wasn’t an Influencer Marketing Success (and Other Lessons from a
Disaster), INFLUENCER MARKETINGHUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/no-fyre-festivalwasnt-an-influencer-marketing-success-and-other-lessons-from-a-disaster/ (last updated Jan. 31,
2019) [https://perma.cc/37WJ-E3NH].
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concertgoers. 7 Influencer marketing is a “type of marketing that focuses on
using key leaders to drive [a] brand’s message to the larger market.” 8 An
influencer is someone who “exerts” his or her influence in ways that “inspire[] or guide[] the actions of others.” 9 Seeking to offset the exorbitant
costs of hosting an event on a private island, Fyre Festival, Inc. jumpstarted
its marketing efforts by contracting with sixty-three high-profile influencers
to simultaneously post “a vague orange colored graphic” with the hashtag
#FyreFest. 10
As over 400 influencers joined Fyre Festival’s marketing ranks, almost
all of their social media posts failed to comply with the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) disclosure requirement compelling influencers to inform
the public of any payments or material benefits received for promoting the
festival. 11 The FTC imposes this disclosure obligation pursuant to Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which entrusts the
agency with the responsibility of regulating a wide array of business

7. Atanu Shaw, What Marketers Can Learn From the Fyre Festival’s Influencer Marketing
Fiasco, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2019/04/16/what-marketers-can-learn-from-the-fyre-festivals-influencer-marketingfiasco/#25fb03b31308 [http://archive.today/78v5r].
8. Influencer Marketing, TAPINFLUENCE (June 2, 2015), https://www.tapinfluence.com
/blog-what-is-influencer-marketing/#what_is [https://perma.cc/48AE-7JZ4]. Key leaders in this
area are known as “influencers.” See The Ultimate Guide to Influencer Marketing, IZEA, https://
izea.com/influencer-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/PB7J-YZ42].
9. Influencer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/influencer [https://perma.cc/7KXE-JA59].
10. No, Fyre Festival Wasn’t an Influencer Marketing Success (and Other Lessons from a
Disaster), supra note 6. Among those contracted were celebrities like Kendall Jenner, Emily Ratajowski, and Hailey Baldwin, who were each paid excessive sums of money and other incentives in
exchange for a few social media posts promoting the supposed lucrative event.
11. See Shaw, supra note 7 (“[Fyre Festival] reportedly spent millions in . . . payments to
influencers and celebrities that promoted Fyre . . . [a]nd most of the influencers also violated the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations”). Fyre Festival “spen[t] millions on flying the models/influencers down to the Bahamas every other weekend, so the models could take pictures from
the beach and on yachts,” thereby emitting a luxurious vibe for its promotional content. No, Fyre
Festival Wasn’t an Influencer Marketing Success (and Other Lessons from a Disaster), supra note
6. See also 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2020) (informing influencers and advertisers that they must fully
disclose any connection between the parties that might materially affect an endorsement); FED.
TRADE COMM’N, DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS (2019), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/1001a-influencer-guide-508_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JB76-NNL5].
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practices, including advertising and its influencer marketing subset. 12 Surprisingly, the FTC abrogated this responsibility by not pursuing the parties
involved in the catastrophic event, 13 but even if it had, it was ill-equipped to
remedy the concertgoers’ losses. 14
To date, influencer marketing has opened a variety of lucrative incomeproducing opportunities to all but has remained mostly unregulated. 15 Without strictly imposed rules and regulations, the lure of fame and substantial
material compensation has led many individuals and companies to partake
in deceptive actions to the detriment of consumers when exploiting the digital marketing method. 16 While some influencers are genuinely unfamiliar
with the disclosure requirements, the mostly unregulated landscape gives
others the perverse incentive to purposefully provide inadequate disclosure
with the hope that the endorsed content emits a trustworthy appeal to consumers. 17 Consequently, consumers are left speculating as to whether posts
are sponsored, and many pay the price for an influencer’s failed disclosure
with no FTC intervention. 18

12. The FTC has broad authority to regulate activities involving “unfair” or “deceptive”
practice that affect commerce. See Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
45(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2018).
13. See Nicholas Sun, Influencers Under Fyre: The Case for Greater Enforcement of FTC
Endorsement Guidelines Against Social Media Influencers, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/184 [https://perma.cc
/G3FB-QYZB].
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. See Simon Owens, Is It Time to Regulate Social Media Influencers?, N.Y. MAG.:
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 17, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/is-it-time-to-regulate-social-media-influencers.html [http://archive.today/CxQm1].
16. See id.
17. See Complaint at 3, In re Machinima, Inc., No. C-4569 (F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Machinima Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/160317machinimacmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7FZ-REEQ] (“[T]he influencers agreed to keep
confidential at all times in perpetuity all matters relating to their agreement with Respondent.”);
see also Complaint at 2, In re Warner Bros. Home Ent. Inc., No. C-4595 (F.T.C. Nov. 17, 2016)
[hereinafter Warner Bros. Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/161811warner_bros_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8EG-EB28] (“Video[s] will promote
positive sentiment about the game.”).
18. See Owens, supra note 15; see also Sun, supra note 13.
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Part II of this Note discusses the history of influencer marketing and its
impact on motivating influencers and companies to engage in deceptive conduct. Part III provides insight into the FTC’s authority to regulate influencers and its guides concerning disclosure. Part IV demonstrates that the
FTC’s enforcement mechanisms are useless against violators without implementation of fundamental changes. Part V argues that the FTC should use
its rulemaking authority to deem failed disclosure an FTC Act violation and
require that every contractual endorsement agreement with influencers include mandatory provisions respecting disclosure. By choosing to regulate
influencer marketing in this manner, the FTC would rectify its previous enforcement failures, thereby aiding consumers in accurately assessing endorsed content. 19

II. THE EVOLUTION OF INFLUENCER MARKETING AND THE CURRENT
INCENTIVE TO ENGAGE IN DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES
In the twenty-first century, the influencer marketing industry continues
to proliferate year after year. 20 The estimated influencer marketing growth
for 2020 is $9.7 billion, an increase of $8 billion from 2016. 21 A vast majority of companies now create standalone budgets dedicated to the contentbased marketing method. 22 While the media often criticizes the sincerity of
influencers, there is no question that the influencer marketing industry is a
“highly popular and effective form of marketing.” 23 Nevertheless, as influencer marketing continues to grow, so does the concern over the growth of
deceptive business practices. 24

19. See generally DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11.
20. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, INFLUENCER
MARKETINGHUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/influencer-marketing-benchmark-report2020/ (last updated Mar. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KJ55-DQQF].
21. See id.
22. Influencer marketing relies on influencers to generate content on their social media
platforms. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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A. The Brief History of Early Influencer Marketing
Contrary to the common misconception, influencer marketing predates
the twentieth century. 25 Although the marketing method is not a new invention, the term “influencer” has recently gained traction and was officially
added to the English dictionary in 2019. 26 One of the first influencer collaborations was between a potter named Josiah Wedgwood and Queen Charlotte
of England in 1760. 27 The “forward-thinking” potter created a tea set for the
Queen and marketed it as “Royal-approved,” cementing the brand with the
luxurious status that it still holds to this day. 28 Monarchs dominated the influencer status during this period in British history, but in the modern era,
celebrities too became entrusted with the power to influence. 29
In 1984, Nike, an athletic shoe company, took a gamble on a young
basketball player by spending nearly all of its shoe marketing budget to create a new signature shoe line that would cement the rookie player as the original “signature shoe king.” 30 Labeled as a “once-in-a-generation athlete,”
Michael Jordan not only became a household name in the sports world but
also a famous cultural icon. 31 Nike’s bet ultimately paid off. To illustrate,
the Jordan brand made billions of dollars in profits in the 2019 fiscal year. 32
Consumers worldwide spend their hard-earned capital for even the slightest

25. See Aaron Brooks, [Timeline] A Brief History of Influencers, SOCIALMEDIATODAY
(May 9, 2019), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/timeline-a-brief-history-of-influencers
/554377/ [https://perma.cc/AB27-SYF5].
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Ronald D. White, How Michael Jordan Became a Brand, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-ig-michael-jordan-jordan-brand-sneakerssneaker-20190214-story.html [https://archive.is/gvKLX].
31. See id.
32. See Kurt Badenhausen, How Michael Jordan Will Make $145 Million in 2019, FORBES
(Aug. 28, 2019, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2019/08/28/how-michael-jordan-will-make-145-million-in-2019/#6391d5631064 [http://archive.today/1x3tP].

COOPER_MACROS_V5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

1/5/2021 12:03 PM

INFLUENCERS

83

chance to play like “the guy who could fly” on the basketball court. 33 As a
testament to the brand’s success, although Michael Jordan retired in 2003,
he still commands influence over consumer purchases because his persona
and name brand are synonymous with greatness. 34 Celebrities, in addition
to star athletes, remain highly sought after for their reach and ability to connect with younger generations. 35 As social media platforms continue to garner mass popularity in recent years, the influencer market has evolved, becoming more prevalent, and enabled almost anyone to become an
influencer. 36

B. How the Modern Incarnation of Influencer Marketing Practices
Paves the Way for Fraudulent Business Practices
As society becomes overly dependent on technology in the twenty-first
century, 37 the internet has become a center for individuals to create a profitable business by influencing others across their designated social media profiles. 38 Social media has progressed beyond the mere function of communication by converging with e-commerce, whereby companies turn to
influencers as prominent figures to market their products. 39 Social media
platforms like Instagram and TikTok are becoming a primary method for

33. See White, supra note 30.
34. See Scott Davis et al., Most Americans Think Michael Jordan is the ‘GOAT’ over Lebron James, and It’s Not Even Close, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:38 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jordan-lebron-goat-debate-americans-jordan-2019-3
[https://perma.cc/3NEE5E5B].
35. See generally Georgia Hatton, Micro Influencers vs Macro Influencers,
SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/micro-influencers-vs-macro-influencers/516896/ [https://perma.cc/WP4W-DGGJ].
36. See Brooks, supra note 25.
37. See Marguerite Darlington, This is What Digital Addiction Looks Like, REWIRE (Dec.
12, 2017), https://www.rewire.org/digital-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/CH7P-5RJQ].
38. See Shane Barker, How to Make Money on Social Media as an Influencer, SHANE
BARKER (Mar. 31, 2020), https://shanebarker.com/blog/influencer-make-big-money-on-socialmedia/ [https://perma.cc/8RX7-GACT].
39. See Audrey Schomer, Influencer Marketing: State of the Social Media Influencer Market in 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/influencermarketing-report [https://perma.cc/HYB4-TNFS].
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companies to connect with younger generations of consumers. 40 Moreover,
it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a brand that does not implement
an influencer marketing campaign on Instagram. 41 Because of its success,
influencer marketing is now a typical expense on a company’s balance
sheet. 42 By the year 2022, companies are set to spend upwards of $15 billion
on influencer marketing. 43 While there are many monetary benefits that
await those who venture into the realm of influencer marketing, 44 it is crucial
to first gain insight into the marketing method’s pay-for-endorsement structure to understand the negative connotations it implicitly invokes.
Before embarking on an influencer marketing journey, companies must
consider a host of factors to determine how to reach the right target audience. 45 While not an exhaustive list, many companies consider the following
factors in selecting an influencer: social media platform, influencer following, engagement rates, market category, content format, campaign deliverables, exclusivity, and production costs. 46 Influencers, too, consider these
factors when electing to build a business around their respective followings. 47 These influencers selectively tailor their content using factors they
believe companies prioritize, which empowers influencers to “charge in a
manner similar to any business offering a service.” 48
Since influencer marketing is a service-oriented industry, influencers
are frequently segmented into a tiered system based on their social media
followings. 49 Using a tiered system, marketers can paint a picture of the
40. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.
41. See generally id.
42. See generally id.
43. See Schomer, supra note 39.
44. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.
45. See Influencer Rates: How Much Do Influencers Charge?, MEDIAKIX, https://mediakix.com/blog/influencer-rates/ [https://perma.cc/4XUF-ZVXF].
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
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estimated costs for electing to retain a particular type of influencer. 50 At the
bottom tier are nano-influencers who are like most of the general population
without celebrity-like status, have follower counts of less than ten thousand,
and generally receive free products or monetary compensation up to $500
for each endorsed post. 51 While compensation in this tier seems quite minuscule, nano-influencers can earn anywhere between $30,000 to $60,000
per year. 52 Next are micro-influencers who have followings of ten to fifty
thousand accounts and can charge companies anywhere from $200 to $4,000
per post, 53 making $40,000 to $100,000 annually. 54 Macro-influencers are
one tier above micro-influencers and have a following of five hundred thousand to one million accounts, which allows them to demand compensation
of $5,000 to $25,000 per post. 55 Lastly, a mega-influencer is in the highest
tier, eclipsing the compensation that macro-influencers receive while having
a following of over a one million accounts. 56 Within the mega-influencer
tier, which often includes celebrities, are individuals who can command
compensation of more than $500,000 per post. 57
As influencer marketing has exploded from its infancy on social media,
its landscape has continued to evolve. 58 In the past decade, companies have
diverted away from securing the traditional type of influencer. 59 Companies
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Audrey Conklin, How Much Money Do Social Media Influencers Make?,
FOXBUSINESS (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/social-media-influencerpay [https://perma.cc/5LBQ-CWBU].
53. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.
54. See Conklin, supra note 52.
55. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Conklin, supra note 52.
58. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.
59. See Megan DeGruttola, Why the Future of Influencer Marketing Will Be Organic Influencers, SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/why-thefuture-of-influencer-marketing-will-be-organic-influencers/567463/
[https://perma.cc/BC25ANFD].
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used to select traditional influencers such as celebrities or individuals with a
high number of followers based on the belief that consumers would purchase
more of their products or services. 60 Much to the dismay of these companies,
while “traditional influencers may have been able to deliver the initial eyeballs,” research has demonstrated that high viewership does not equate to a
higher purchase rate by the consumer. 61 To illustrate, “many people follow
mega-influencers and celebrities, they often do so, simply because they recognize the name, rather than for any great interest in the topic of [their]
posts.” 62
Moreover, due to an oversaturated industry and barrage of high-profile
scandals, the general public is gradually losing the trust they once placed in
mega and celebrity influencers. 63 Consequently, the current trend followed
by companies is to secure nano or micro influencers rather than their mega
or celebrity counterparts. 64 However, there are drawbacks to this modern
trend. The FTC has limited resources, making it inefficient to police the
thousands of nano or micro influencers who have little notoriety aside from
their small followings. 65

C. Influencer Marketing’s Contractual Nature is the Culprit for
Encouraging Deceptive Behavior
As the general population becomes less inclined to respond to traditional marketing methods, influencer marketing has growing exponentially. 66 The current generation is deeply persuaded by advertising and

60. See generally id.
20.

61. See id.; see also The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note
62. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.
63. See DeGruttola, supra note 59.
64. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.

65. The FTC is an agency with finite resources, making it selective in pursuing violators
who have a greater following of accounts to set an example. See Laura E. Bladow, Worth the Click:
Why Greater FTC Enforcement Is Needed to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influencer Marketing,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1141 (2018).
66. See generally DeGruttola, supra note 59.
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promotional content that radiates an authentic yet creative feel. 67 In order to
appeal to these unique desires, marketers have turned to influencers to create
“high-quality content that fits within their brand aesthetic” and fulfills that
authentic appeal. 68 However, authentic content becomes eerily suspicious if
one considers “that the minute you pay someone for content, it becomes inherently inauthentic.” 69
Influence is successful when it is premised on credibility, but can be
corrupted if it is based on deception. 70 While this may seem intuitive, many
consumers do not realize that deception is inherent in the contractual nature
of influencer marketing. 71 When individuals are contractually obligated to
repeatedly mention a product or company or post promotional content of a
company on their respective social media accounts, they cease to be influencers. 72 Instead, the influencer functions as an online “mercenary,” an individual who will post promotional content for the right price or material
benefit. 73 Inadvertently, a sliver of marketing that was intended to establish
an authentic connection is replaced with individuals who are simply “walking advertisement[s].” 74 A recurring theme in influencer marketing “is to
deceive, to make believe that a recommendation is genuine and to hide the
fact that there is a contract.” 75
A series of scandals reveal the underlying problems with the influencer
marketing model. 76 If brands “stipulate how often an influencer has to
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Enrique Dans, Influencer Marketing: A Phony Industry Based on False Premises,
FORBES (July 17, 2019, 6:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2019/07/17/influencer-marketing-a-phony-industry-based-on-falsepremises/#b4fcf5460d6b [http://archive.today
/rjRGO].
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See DeGruttola, supra note 59. See also Kaya Yurieff, Instagram Star Isn’t What She
Seems. But Brands are Buying In, CNN BUS. (June 25, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://money.cnn.com
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mention [the] brand and where and when, while . . . [hoping] he or she [does
not] do something disastrous,” authenticity becomes but a mere fable. 77 For
instance, Bootea, a detox tea company, engaged celebrity influencer Scott
Disick to market its tea products using his Instagram platform to reach target
audiences. 78 However, due to the degree of control Bootea maintained over
his social media posts and Disick’s failure to act diligently, Disick accidentally copied and pasted the company’s directions into his post, including
the time to post and the pre-written caption drafted by the company. 79 Disick’s mishap unintentionally alerted the public to the contractual nature behind his decision to post the content, thereby exposing the deception behind
their relationship. 80
Consumers are not the only parties who experience the shortcomings
of a marketing method that idolizes individuals who allegedly have influence. 81 Companies must grapple with the fact that “social networks are filled
with imaginary people whose followers, likes and comments are paid for and
who have absolutely zero influence.” 82 The desire to secure a lucrative contract through the appearance of authenticity and a large following has incentivized influencers “[t]o appear more influential than they actually are” by
inflating their online presence with purchased fake followers. 83 CNBC reported that the fraudulent activity of buying fake followers to “like” or comment on social media posts cost advertisers an estimated $1.3 billion in

/2018/06/25/technology/lil-miquela-social-media-influencer-cgi/index.html?sr=liCNN062518lilmiquela-social-media-influencer-cgi0144PMStory.cgi/index.html?sr=liCNN062518lil-miquelasocial-media-influencer-cgi0144PMStory [https://perma.cc/5MPV-DD4T]; Conklin, supra note
52.
77. Dans, supra note 70.
78. See Hatton, supra note 35.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See generally Dans, supra note 70; DeGruttola, supra note 59.
82. Dans, supra note 70.
83. Megan Graham, Fake Followers in Influencer Marketing Will Cost $1.3 Billion This
Year, Report Says, CNBC (July 24, 2019, 1:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/24/fake-followers-in-influencer-marketing-will-cost-1point3-billion-in-2019.html [https://perma.cc/ZV7XG2EJ].
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2019. 84 The fraudulent practice was so profitable that an American company
named Devumi was able to earn millions of dollars by selling followers “to
celebrities, businesses and anyone who wants to appear more popular or exert influence online.” 85 As companies and consumers grow increasingly concerned over influencer fraud due to deceptive behavior influencers routinely
employ, 86 the FTC must strike at the heart of influencer marketing by making disclosure a required element in every influencer-company endorsement
contract. 87

III. THE FTC’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INFLUENCER MARKETING
AND THE USE OF ITS ENDORSEMENT GUIDES TO PROVIDE
INSTRUCTION ON ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE
The FTC is an independent agency of the United States government
dedicated to protecting the rights of consumers. 88 The agency’s mission has
long been “to stop deceptive ads,” which include endorsements made
through a designated social media platform. 89 The FTC periodically provides tips and instructions on how to comply with relevant laws. 90 Before
discussing the disclosure requirements that influencers must follow, it is necessary to describe the FTC’s scope of regulatory authority, which ultimately
gave rise to the FTC’s Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (“Endorsement Guides”).

A. The Establishment of the FTC’s Power to Regulate the Unfair

84. See id.
85. Nicholas Confessore et al., The Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html [https://perma.cc
/X5H6-JZNH].
86. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.
87. See infra Part V.
88. See Sorilbran Stone, The New FTC Regulations For Influencer Marketing, THE SHELF
(July 6, 2017), https://www.theshelf.com/the-blog/ftc-influencer-disclosure-rules [https://perma.cc
/B7FM-JP3C].
89. See DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11.
90. See id.
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and Deceptive Practices Utilized in Influencer Marketing
The FTC Act grants the FTC broad powers to prohibit “persons, partnerships, or corporations” from engaging in “unfair” or “deceptive” practices
that affect commerce. 91 An act or practice is considered “unfair” if it “causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.” 92 The FTC Act does not define
“deceptive acts or practices,” 93 but the FTC has issued a policy statement
providing guidance on the term “deception.” 94 In the policy statement, the
FTC defines deception as “a representation, omission or practice that is likely
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” 95 More importantly, an omission is deceptive “when
qualifying information necessary to prevent a practice, claim, representation,
or reasonable expectation or belief from being misleading is not disclosed.” 96
Not all deceptive omissions are actionable. 97 The omission in question
must be material, meaning that “consumers are likely to have chosen differently but for the deception.” 98 The test applied by the FTC is “whether the
consumer’s interpretation or reaction is reasonable” in light of the claim being brought. 99 An interpretation may be reasonable even if not shared by a
majority of the relevant class; rather, a deceptive act needs only to “[mislead]

91. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A).
94. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Honorable
John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct.
14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Deception], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/5NWJ-XE9B].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Omissions that are not material are not actionable. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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a significant minority of reasonable consumers.” 100 Courts have interpreted
a “significant minority” as slightly above or precisely ten percent of affected
reasonable consumers. 101
In its mission to prevent deceptive practices, the FTC may exercise its
rulemaking authority to prescribe two different sets of rules, each having its
own implications. 102 First, the FTC may furnish “interpretive rules and general statements of policy” to provide guidance on avoiding conduct that
amounts “to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 103 Interpretative rules are more akin to guidelines and do not carry
the weight of law, meaning violators will not be subject to civil penalties or
consumer redress under the FTC Act’s Section 5 and Section 19, respectively. 104 Second, the FTC can issue “rules which define with specificity
[the] acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.” 105 Unlike interpretative rules, these defined rules
function as formal rules of law, granting the FTC the discretion to pursue
civil penalties and consumer redress against violators. 106 The framework of
the Endorsement Guides, which articulate the disclosure requirements for
both influencers and the companies that contract with influencers, is the embodiment of the FTC’s interpretative rule promulgation designed to prevent

100. Id.
101. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (affirming
a finding of deception where an ad misleads at least ten percent of the purchasing public); see also
FTC v. John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1070-71 n.88 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(“10.5% to 17.3% . . . is sufficient to prove the complaint allegation that the challenged representation had been made.”).
102. See Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2018); see also A
Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://
perma.cc/W74N-PQP5].
103. 15 U.S.C. § 57a.
104. The FTC may pursue a civil action for civil penalties or consumer redress when an
individual violates a rule “other than an interpretive rule.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m), 57b.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 57a. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m), 57b. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.

COOPER_MACROS_V5 (DO NOT DELETE)

92

1/5/2021 12:03 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

deceptive behavior in influencer marketing. 107 However, since they are interpretative guides and not formal rules, 108 they serve a weak function to further the FTC’s mission.

B. The Framework of the FTC’s Disclosure Requirement: An
Attempt at Preventing Influencers and Companies from Acting
Deceptive with Endorsements
The FTC realizes that “[e]ndorsements are an important tool for advertisers and they can be persuasive to consumers” but can also be “misleading
if they are not accompanied by information describing what consumers can
generally expect from use of the product or service.” 109 To prevent misleading consumers, the FTC issued its Endorsement Guides to demonstrate that
influencer marketing is subject to the same truthful advertising laws that apply to other forms of advertising. 110 In particular, the Endorsement Guides
seek to link “the application of Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . to the use of
endorsements and testimonials in [influencer marketing].” 111 The Endorsement Guides are not conclusive on “whether the law has been violated.” 112
Consequently, “there are no civil penalties associated with [violating] them.
But if advertisers fail to comply, “the FTC may decide to investigate whether
the practices are unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act.” 113
Compliance with the Endorsement Guides is not mandatory; rather,
they provide influencers and companies with the information necessary to
voluntarily comply with the law. 114 For purposes of enforcing the FTC Act,

107. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2020).
108. See id.; see also Advertisement Endorsements, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/advertisement-endorsements
[https://perma.cc/S7EF-FAV9].
109. Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 108.
110. See id.
111. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
112. Bladow, supra note 65, at 1135 n.97 (citations omitted).
113. Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 108.
114. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
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the FTC treats endorsements and testimonials identically. 115 The FTC defines endorsement as:
[A]ny advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other
identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name
or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe
reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party
other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed
by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser.
The party whose opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience the
message appears to reflect will be called the endorser and may be
an individual, group, or institution. 116
When making an endorsement, the endorser’s message “must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.” 117 Accordingly, consumer endorsements do not serve as “competent and reliable scientific evidence.” 118
The Endorsement Guides require full disclosure of “a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement.” 119 A “material
connection” to a seller or brand includes “a personal, family, or employment
relationship or a financial relationship – such as the brand paying you or
giving you free or discounted products or services.” 120 In complying with
the Endorsement Guides, a disclosure must “clearly and conspicuously”
place consumers on notice that they are viewing an endorsement. 121 Because
115. While not formally defined in the statute, testimonials are statements that an individual
makes regarding the benefits of a product or service he or she used. See id.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a).
118. 16 C.F.R. § 255.2.
119. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
120. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0; DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note
11, at 2.
121. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
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the Endorsement Guides do not define the degree of disclosure required, 122
the FTC has supplied supplemental guides that provide clarification. 123 “In
evaluating whether a disclosure is likely to be clear and conspicuous, advertisers should consider its placement in the ad and its proximity to the relevant
claim. The closer the disclosure is to the claim to which it relates, the better.” 124 Additionally, other important considerations include:
[T]he prominence of the disclosure; whether it is unavoidable;
whether other parts of the ad distract attention from the disclosure;
whether the disclosure needs to be repeated at different places on
a website; whether disclosures in audio messages are presented in
an adequate volume and cadence; whether visual disclosures appear for a sufficient duration; and whether the language of the disclosure is understandable to the intended audience. 125
The FTC also emphasizes that “[d]isclosures must be effectively communicated to consumers before they make a purchase or incur a financial obligation.” 126 These principles are highly adaptable and meant to be implemented
across almost any platform. 127 Nevertheless, if a designated “platform does
not provide an opportunity to make clear and conspicuous disclosures, then
that platform should not be used to disseminate advertisements that require
[such] disclosures.” 128
The FTC emphasizes that advertisers should perceive their advertisements from a reasonable consumer’s perspective. 129 In determining whether
an advertisement is misleading, the “key is the overall net impression” in the
122. See id.
123. See .Com Disclosures: How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital Advertising, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, (Mar. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus41dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC9-JJGW].
124. Id. at i.
125. Id. at i-ii.
126. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at i.
128. Id. at iii.
129. See id. at 6.
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eyes of a consumer. 130 As such, it is the influencer’s “responsibility to make
these disclosures, to be familiar with the Endorsement Guides, and to comply
with laws against deceptive ads.” 131 Adequate disclosure “will depend on
the specific factual circumstances,” or put more simply, a case-by-case basis. 132 “Liability as an endorser turns on whether a consumer would reasonably attribute the views, opinions, or beliefs expressed as personal to the
speaker or merely as those of the sponsoring advertiser.” 133 Despite the specificity of the FTC’s disclosure requirements, liability is seldomly imposed
by the FTC, resulting in a plethora of influencers that avoid liability even
after failing to comply. 134 Without formal rules that impose civil penalties,
voluntary compliance is insufficient to remedy this deceptive behavior. 135

IV. THE FTC’S ENFORCEMENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST INFLUENCERS
WHO FAIL TO DISCLOSE AND ITS INABILITY TO DETER THE DECEPTIVE
BEHAVIOR
Before 2015, influencer marketing was in its infancy compared to the
billion-dollar industry it has become today. 136 However, by the beginning of
2015, influencer marketing began gaining traction. 137 At the time, “brands
were really just starting to test ads on the platform to see if the FTC was
really paying attention.” 138 Shortly thereafter, it became increasingly clear
to brands that it was lucrative to leverage social media to market their

130. Id.
131. DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11.
132. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2020).
133. FTC v. Garvey, NO. CV 00-9358 (GAF)(CWx), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25060, at *18
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2001).
134. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20 (“If
influencers don’t improve their performance soon, there is a real danger that the FTC . . . will start
prosecuting rather than just warning and educating.”).
135. See infra Part IV.
136. See generally Stone, supra note 88.
137. See id.
138. Id.
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products and services to consumers. 139 As companies started to strategize
for creative ways to connect with “people using social media for their personal and professional lives,” a pressing need arose to “ensure there are rules
in place to level the playing field between brands, influencers, and consumers.” 140 The FTC attempted to fill the void, investigating and pursuing
“brands, influencers, and consumers” that did not play by the rules. 141

A. An Examination of the FTC’s Enforcement Campaign Against
Federal Trade Commission Act Violators
The FTC “may initiate an enforcement action using either an administrative or judicial process if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the law is being or
has been violated.” 142 The Commission’s principal motive for bringing an
enforcement action is to deter a violator from engaging in the same conduct
in the future. 143 As the first step in an enforcement action, the FTC issues a
complaint setting forth the charges it has reason to believe the respondent
violated. 144 If the respondent accepts the charges and “elects to settle [the
them], it may sign a consent agreement (without admitting liability), consent
to entry of a final order, and waive all right to judicial review.” 145 “If the
respondent elects to contest the charges, the complaint is adjudicated before
an administrative law judge . . . in a trial-type proceeding.” 146 After the

139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102 (emphasis added).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed
to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts”) (emphasis added).
144. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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hearing concludes, the administrative law judge will recommend that the
FTC either enter an order to cease and desist or dismiss the complaint. 147
Generally, no civil penalties are issued against violators unless a respondent violates the FTC’s final order issued in an enforcement proceeding,
or a non-respondent knowingly violates either the FTC Act or a FTC final
cease and desist order. 148 The latter requires that the violator have “actual
knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule.” 149
Each violation will result in a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per offense, and
depending on the type of offense, may also warrant injunctive and other equitable relief. 150 Additionally, the FTC may seek remedial damages, and
other types of relief against violators of the FTC Act or a FTC final cease
and desist order as a remedial measure for consumer injury. 151 However, the
FTC cannot seek damages or other relief in issuing a final cease and desist
order against a violator unless it can show that the violation related to conduct “which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances
was dishonest or fraudulent.” 152
If the FTC is successful in satisfying this requirement, additional relief
imposed “may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation
of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, [and] the payment of
damages.” 153 The FTC cannot unilaterally obtain civil penalties or consumer
Rather, the FTC must seek “judicial
redress against violators. 154
147. See id.
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).
150. See U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b; see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 57b; see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b; A Brief Overview of the Federal
Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
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enforcement” from any federal district court that the FTC Act empowered to
grant such relief. 155 Nevertheless, the FTC will remain powerless, effectively unable to seek civil penalties or consumer redress, until it deems failed
influencer disclosure an unfair or deceptive act.

B. The FTC’s Enforcement Actions Serve as Educational Lessons
Rather than a Deterrence to Influencers and Companies from
Violating the Federal Trade Commission Act
When brands were just starting to test the uncharted waters by placing
ads on the social media platforms, 156 one of the first brands to use influencer
marketing and catch the eye of the FTC was fashion clothing brand icon Lord
& Taylor, LLC (“Lord & Taylor”). 157 The clothing brand launched an Instagram campaign in 2014, which gave rise to conduct that drove the FTC to
serve Lord & Taylor with a complaint in 2016. 158 The campaign “comprised
of Lord & Taylor-branded blog posts, photos, video uploads, native advertising editorials in online fashion magazines, and use of a team of fashion
influencers recruited for their fashion style and extensive base of followers
on social media platforms.” 159 Each of the fifty selected fashion influencers
were paid compensation ranging from $1,000 to $4,000. 160 The influencers
were given creative freedom to style their post wearing a specific Lord &
Taylor dress, but were contractually obligated to “exclusively mention” the
company using hashtags and photo tags. 161
Although Lord & Taylor’s contractual agreement with the influencers
gave detailed instructions on how to mention the company in their posted
155. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102 (“[T]he Commission must still seek the aid of a court to obtain civil
penalties or consumer redress for violations”); 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
156. See Stone, supra note 88.
157. See Complaint, In re Lord & Taylor LLC, No. C-4576 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016) [hereinafter Lord & Taylor Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/160523lordtaylorcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BB9-C75W].
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id.
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content, the contract did not require these influencers to disclose their material connection to Lord & Taylor. 162 The Instagram campaign was a success,
reaching over 11.4 million individual Instagram users, 163 and resulted in the
dress selling out. 164 In response to the failed disclosure, the FTC ordered
that Lord & Taylor “not misrepresent, in any manner, expressly or by implication, that an endorser of such product or service is an independent user or
ordinary consumer of the product or service.” 165 Further, the FTC ordered
Lord & Taylor “shall clearly and conspicuously, and in close proximity to
the representation, disclose a material connection, if one exists, between such
endorser and [Lord & Taylor].” 166 Yet, the FTC’s Decision and Order did
not impose any form of civil penalties, 167 nor did the FTC pursue any of the
influencers involved. 168
After wrapping up its enforcement action with Lord & Taylor, the FTC
set its sights on another prominent company, Warner Bros. Home Entertainment Inc. (“WBHE”). 169 The deceptive conduct related to the WBHE action
dated back to 2014, however, the liability WBHE faced was due to the conduct of Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment (“WBIE”), a division of
WBHE. 170 Before the release of the video game titled, Middle Earth:
Shadow of Mordor (“Shadow of Mordor”), WBIE hired an advertising

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Decision and Order at 3, In re Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576 (F.T.C. May 20,
2016) [hereinafter Lord & Taylor Order], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/160523lordtaylordo.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7XF-4YN5].
166. Id. at 4.
167. See id.
168. The FTC opted to pursue Lord & Taylor rather than spend its time and resources targeting individual influencers. See Wendy Davis, FTC to Review Influencer Marketing,
MEDIAPOST (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/347001/ftc-to-review-influencer-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/6D2K-BTM3]. See generally Lord & Taylor
Complaint, supra note 157, at 1.
169. See Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17.
170. Id. at 1.
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agency to coordinate a YouTube Influencer Campaign. 171 The agency secured influencers with impressive reputations in both the gaming and
YouTube communities to post positive reviews of the game on their
YouTube channels. 172 These reviews were in direct conflict with FTC’s Endorsement Guides, which state that “[e]ndorsements must reflect the honest
opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.” 173 While the
agency that secured the influencers did provide instruction to the influencers
to place visible sponsorship disclosures “above the fold” in the description
box, most did not comply, either placing the disclosure out of sight “below
the line” or in another inadequate manner. 174
In this instance, the YouTube influencers received a pre-release version
of Shadow of Mordor and a cash payment ranging from a couple hundred to
tens of thousands of dollars. 175 The FTC did find that on at least two occasions, influencers made disclosures that they received free access to the
game. 176 Nevertheless, the disclosure was hardly adequate for the FTC’s
purposes since they omitted that monetary compensation was also received. 177 The YouTube influencers posted over thirty gameplay videos on
YouTube, which were viewed over 5.5 million times by consumers. 178 To
deter the violating conduct, the FTC ordered both WBHE and WBIE to
“[c]learly and [c]onspicuously disclose a [m]aterial [c]onnection” in any future influencer campaign. 179 Again, no implementation of civil penalties

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (2020); see also Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17, at 3
(“In truth and in fact, these gameplay videos of Shadow of Mordor do not reflect the independent
opinions or experiences of impartial video game enthusiasts.”).
174. See Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17, at 2–3.
175. Id. at 1–2.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Decision and Order at 3, In re Warner Bros. Home Entm’t Inc., No. C-4595 (F.T.C.
Nov. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Order], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/161811warner_bros_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3H-8Z5J].
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were included in the FTC’s Decision and Order, nor were any charges
brought against the influencers involved. 180
Until 2017, influencers roamed social media platforms largely free
from any legal consequences. 181 During this period, the FTC reviewed “Instagram posts by celebrities, athletes, and other influencers” and found they
did not comply with the FTC’s guidelines. 182 In response to this finding, the
FTC “sent out more than 90 letters reminding influencers and marketers that
influencers should clearly and conspicuously disclose their relationships to
brands when promoting or endorsing products through social media.” 183
This action marked the first time that the FTC reached out directly to educate
social media influencers. 184 The letters served as a warning that the Endorsement Guides are applicable to both influencers and marketers. 185
A wave of change occurred—or so many thought—on September 7,
2017, when the FTC handed down its first-ever complaint against social media influencers. 186 Trevor Martin and Thomas Cassell, also known respectively by their social media monikers “TmarTn” and “Tom Syndicate,” engaged in conduct that seemed deceptive in operating an online gambling
website using their legal entity, CSGOLotto, Inc (“CGSO Lotto”). 187 Both
individuals were widely known in the gaming community and used their

17.

180. See Warner Bros. Order, supra note 179; see also Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note

181. See CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social
Media Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-ftcs-first-ever-complaint-against
[https://perma.cc
/N788-H6BD].
182. FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/04/ftcstaff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose [https://perma.cc/P9FM-2J9X].
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social
Media Influencers, supra note 181.
187. See id.; see Complaint, In re CSGOLotto, Inc., No. C-4632 (F.T.C. Nov. 28, 2017)
[hereinafter CSGO Lotto Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/1623184_c-_csgolotto_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DTM-4F74].
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influence to profit from unsuspecting consumers who were unaware of their
ownership interest in the website. 188 Primarily, Martin and Cassell preyed
on players of the online video game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive
(“CSGO”) by encouraging gamers to use their “skins,” which are collectible
game items that can be bought or sold for real-world money in order to gamble on the influencers’ website while the influencers collected fees. 189
Each of the influencers created promotional videos on their respective
YouTube channels showing themselves gambling on the site and providing
tips on wining large sums of money. 190 However, when it came to the required disclosures, “[n]owhere in his videos promoting CSGO Lotto or in
the videos’ descriptions did Respondent Martin disclose that he was an officer and owner of the company operating CSGO Lotto or that he was gambling with free skins provided by that company.” 191 The influencers paid
other influencers $2,500 to $55,000 to create posts describing their experiences with the gambling website but prohibited them from saying anything
that would disparage CSGO Lotto’s name. 192 Similarly, these other influencers also failed to disclose the contractual relationship with CSGO Lotto,
but the FTC did not pursue them. 193 Following the FTC’s precedent, the
Commission ordered both Martin and Cassell to comply with the FTC’s disclosure requirements but did not impose any civil penalties. 194 The FTC issued corrective action in all three cases, 195 but such actions were devoid of

188. See CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social
Media Influencers, supra note 181, at 1; see also CSGO Lotto Complaint, supra note 187, at 2.
189. See CSGO Lotto Complaint, supra note 187, at 2.
190. See id. at 2–3.
191. Id. at 2.
192. See id. at 4.
193. See id. at 4-5.
194. See Decision and Order, In re CSGO Lotto, Inc., No. C-4632 (F.T.C. Nov. 28, 2017)
[hereinafter CSGO Lotto Order], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/1623184_c-_csgolotto_decision_and_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JY5-36NE].
195. See Lord & Taylor Complaint, supra note 157; Warner Bros. Order, supra note 179;
CSGO Lotto Order, supra note 194.
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any civil penalties or consumer redress that could be imposed because of one
key detail: “[t]he Guides are not regulations.” 196

C. Unregulated: The Irony of an Enforcement Regime Without
Influence Over an Industry that is Dependent on Influence
Currently, influencer marketing has seemingly escaped the clutches of
any imposed regulatory scheme, while fraudulent practices continue to become more frequent. 197 In response, some social networks have implemented platform tools that make it easier for brands and influencers to post
content in compliance with the FTC’s disclosure requirements. 198 However,
influencers still choose not to comply, and do so without facing any significant consequences from the FTC. 199 Even more concerning, Influencer MarketingHub, an organization that issues annual reports on the state of the influencer marketing industry, conducted a research project analyzing 1,000
fashion micro-influencers posts for a month and found that only 14% complied with the FTC guidelines. 200 Failure to comply is not exclusive to micro- and nano-influencers; celebrities routinely fail to disclose their material
relationship to a brand or company and are often rewarded with massive
amounts of compensation. 201
Reflecting on the FTC’s past conduct, FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra recently stated, “I am concerned that companies paying for undisclosed
influencer endorsements and reviews are not held fully accountable for this
illegal activity.” 202 He further stated, “[w]hile the FTC has pursued enforcement actions against popular brands for disguising their advertising, it is not
clear whether our actions are deterring misconduct in the marketplace, due

196. Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 108.
197. See Owens, supra note 15.
198. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.
199. See CSGO Lotto Order, supra note 194 (the FTC did not impose any sanctions for
failing to disclose); see also Davis, supra note 168; Owens, supra note 15.
200. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.
201. See Shaw, supra note 7; see also Conklin, supra note 52.
202. Davis, supra note 168.
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to the limited sanctions we have pursued.” 203 To date, it is widely believed
that the FTC’s enforcement actions have been too lenient on companies and
influencers involved in the deceptive conduct. 204 Time after time, the FTC
has settled these enforcement actions “for no customer refunds, no forfeiture
of ill-gotten gains, no notice to consumers, no deletion of wrongfully obtained personal data, and no findings or admission of liability.” 205 Moreover,
the FTC’s “punitive actions only represent a tiny portion of the ethical infractions, illegal and otherwise, that are carried out within the influencer
marketing world every day.” 206 As influencer marketing remains “largely
unregulated,” with fraud “becoming more rampant,” 207 there still has been
no action by the FTC to use its rulemaking authority to pass formal rules that
regulate influencer marketing.

V. PROPOSITION: IT IS TIME FOR THE FTC TO OVERHAUL THE
INFLUENCER MARKETING INDUSTRY TO PROTECT CONSUMERS AND
BUSINESSES
To date, influencer marketing is left highly “unregulated” with industry
players invoking their own self-regulatory schemes to prevent deceptive behavior, which are neither adequate nor in compliance with the FTC’s standards. 208 “Studies have shown how reviews can lead to an increase in
sales,” 209 but the FTC continues to allow influencers and companies to

203. Id.
204. See id.; See also Owens, supra note 15 (“In instances when it has targeted actual influencers, the FTC has mostly issued warning letters demanding they clean up their act.”).
205. Davis, supra note 168.
206. Owens, supra note 15.
207. Id.
208. See id. (“[T]he [FTC] revealed that the disclosure tools that platforms like Facebook
have put in place are not sufficient.”).
209. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding
the Endorsement Guides Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1566445/p204500_-_endorsement_guides_reg_review__chopra_stmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP74-4MJS].
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escape liability for their actions. 210 Accordingly, it is imperative that the
FTC rise to the occasion and combat this “$8.2 billion ad fraud problem” by
making the following two changes. 211 First, the FTC must use its rulemaking
authority to adopt formal rules from its disclosure provisions in the Endorsement Guides. Second, the FTC should regulate the influencer-company relationship by requiring that certain provisions are present in every endorsement contract.

A. Going Beyond Guidance: The Use of the FTC’s Rulemaking
Authority to Develop Stringent Rules that Actually Prevent Deceptive
Behavior
The FTC must first adopt certain provisions of the Endorsement Guides
into formal rules. Currently, the FTC’s Endorsement Guides serve as a substantial education tool for influencers and companies in its mission “to stop
deceptive ads.” 212 However, the Endorsement Guides’ inherent flaw is their
unenforceability. 213 To remedy this flaw, the Endorsement Guides should
no longer be solely used as an education tool. Instead, the FTC should codify
certain aspects of the Endorsement Guides into formal rules that would enable the FTC to seek civil penalties, remedial damages, and other relief in
accordance with the FTC Act. 214 In particular, the FTC should, at a minimum, adopt the disclosure provisions from the Endorsement Guides, deeming it a violation of the FTC Act for failed compliance. The disclosure provisions state, “[w]hen there exists a connection between the endorser and the
seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or
credibility of the endorsement material connection . . . such connection must

210. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.
211. Owens, supra note 15.
212. DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11.
213. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2020) (“The Guides provide the basis for voluntary compliance
with the law by advertisers and endorsers.”) (emphasis added).
214. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(l)–(m), 57b (2018); see also Dami Lee, The FTC is Cracking
Down on Influencer Marketing on YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, VERGE (Feb. 12, 2020, 5:15
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/12/21135183/ftc-influencer-ad-sponsored-tiktokyoutube-instagram-review [https://archive.is/zAn2N].
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be fully disclosed.” 215 Moreover, the advertisement or endorsement should
“clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement” or that the endorser
favored the advertised product for some material benefit. 216
By converting the disclosure provisions into formal rules, the FTC is
validly exercising its rulemaking authority pursuant to section 18 of the FTC
Act. 217 While some may fear that the imposition of civil penalties may disproportionately affect nano- or micro-influencers who often receive little
compensation in exchange for their endorsements, this concern is alleviated
given that district courts will consider several factors in determining the
amount of the penalty. 218 These factors include “the degree of culpability,
any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue
to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.” 219 Critics may
also question whether influencers who did not know about the disclosure
requirements should face civil penalties for violating the newly adopted
rules. However, this concern is also mitigated. The FTC Act contains a
safeguard whereby the FTC must prove the influencer violated the rule with
“actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such
rule.” 220
Adopting the disclosure provisions into formal rules would provide the
FTC with the tools to deter deceptive conduct. For example, Thomas Cassell
was not a first-time offender when he failed to disclose his ownership interest
in the CSGO Lotto case. 221 Cassell was involved in a prior FTC enforcement
215. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
216. Id.
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (“[T]he Commission may prescribe . . . rules which define with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 3; Lesley Fair, Three FTC Actions of
Interest to Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://www.ftc.gov
/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/09/three-ftc-actions-interest-influencers [https://perma.cc
/HSA3-BMHJ].
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action against Machinima, Inc. (“Machinima”), where he was not sued, but
the complaint did mention that “[n]owhere in the videos or in the videos’
descriptions did Cassell disclose that [Machinima] paid him to create and
upload them.” 222 If the disclosure provisions were formal rules, the FTC
could have done more against Cassell, a repeat offender, when the FTC issued the formal order to comply in the CSGO Lotto case. 223 By being previously implicated in the FTC’s enforcement action against Machinima, 224
Cassell clearly had requisite knowledge in CSGO Lotto to be eligible for
civil penalties under section 45 of the FTC Act. 225 Moreover, his decision
to hide his ownership interest while pocketing fees from unwitting consumers would enable the FTC to pursue consumer redress pursuant to section 19,
which includes “refund[ing] [consumer] money” and “pay[ing] damages.” 226
While the FTC never brought charges against any of the parties involved in the Fyre Festival disaster, 227 with newly adopted formal rules, the
FTC could have pursued the influencers for consumer redress. 228 Therefore,
if the FTC is exhausted from settling its enforcement actions “for no customer refunds, no forfeiture of ill-gotten gains, . . . and no findings or admission of liability,” 229 it must codify the disclosure provisions into formal rules.

B. Promulgating the Contractual Provisions that Govern an
Influencer-Company Relationship
To reinforce its decision to adopt the disclosure provisions into formal
rules, the FTC should again use its rulemaking authority, specifying the provisions that must be present in every influencer-company contract. Contracts
are the creation of a fundamental component that gives rise to the influencer222. Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 3 (emphasis added).
223. See CSGO Lotto Order, supra note 194, at 2.
224. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 3; see also Fair, supra note 221.
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2018).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
227. See Sun, supra note 13.
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b (“The court . . . shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the
court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers”) (emphasis added).
229. Davis, supra note 168.
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company endorsement relationship. 230 Continuously, the FTC has stood idly
while watching companies exploit this legally enforceable function to avoid
appearing less than authentic. 231 Since companies retain a vast amount of
leverage when selecting the right influencer for its campaign, 232 it is appropriate that the entity that drafts the contract must also include contractual
provisions that mandate that influencers comply with the Endorsement
Guides. These contractual provisions should be modeled after the FTC’s
“.com Disclosures” guide, which provides precise instructions on how to
give “clear and conspicuous” disclosure in accordance with the Endorsement
guides. 233 Furthermore, the provisions should also include language that
“[e]ndorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.” 234 Additionally, as Federal Trade Commissioner
Chopra stated, the FTC could provide “sample terms that companies can include in contracts.” 235
By using its rulemaking authority granted in section 18 of the FTC Act,
the FTC could make it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a company
to fail to include provisions that provide instruction on giving adequate disclosure. 236 Moreover, this is not the first time that the FTC has used this
authority to govern the contractual relationship between two parties. 237 For
example, the FTC created the Credit Practices Rule, which affects consumer

230. See generally Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17; Machinima Complaint, supra
note 17, at 2.
231. See Lee, supra note 214; Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17, at 4; Machinima
Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
232. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.
233. .Com Disclosures, supra note 123, at ii-iii.
234. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2020).
235. See Chopra, supra note 209.
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b (2018) (demonstrating that the FTC deemed it an unfair act or
practice within the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act for creditor to take or receive certain
contractual obligations).
237. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2020); see also Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-creditpractices-rule [https://perma.cc/HK7P-9TLB].
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contracts by prohibiting the use of specific provisions. 238 If a creditor does
not comply with the Credit Practices Rule, the FTC can sue the violator in
federal court for civil penalties. 239 Similarly, with the new formal rules modeled on the FTC’s guides, the FTC could seek civil penalties against a company in violation. 240 Additionally, if an influencer were to fail to abide by
the FTC’s required contractual provisions, companies could then disclaim
liability by terminating the agreement and seeking recourse, a practice that
companies have routinely employed with breaching influencers. 241
To date, the FTC continues to discover companies that provide inadequate or nonexistent instructions on giving adequate disclosure in compliance with the FTC’s requirements. 242 Moreover, such companies habitually
direct the contracted endorser to review the company in a positive light. 243
There is nothing to indicate that these deceptive practices are slowing down.
More recently, Sunday Riley Modern Skincare, LLC, a cosmetic company
that sold its products through Sephora, was the subject of an FTC enforcement action for instructing its employees to post fake positive reviews of its
products. 244 The company also provided instructions on masking their IP
addresses and engaging in other questionable methods to avoid detection. 245
However, the FTC settled the matter without civil penalties and without the
company admitting fault. 246
If the FTC is exhausted from not seeing changes in these types of behaviors, it must require certain provisions to be present in every influencer237.

238. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2; see also Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, supra note
239. See Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, supra note 237.
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).
241. See Garson, supra note 2.
242. See, e.g., Lord & Taylor Complaint, supra note 157, at 2.

243. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 2 (“[Machinima] directed each influencer
to include . . . Microsoft in a positive light”); see also Chopra, supra note 209.
244. See Cristina Miranda, Cosmetic Company Wrote Fake Reviews, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/10/cosmetic-company-wrote-fake-reviews [https://perma.cc/YLZ6-CPAZ].
245. Id.
246. Id.
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company contract. No longer would companies like Warner Brothers, Machinima, or Sunday Riley Modern Skincare be able to escape liability. 247 The
FTC would have adequate mechanisms, such as civil penalties and damages, 248 at its disposal to penalize and prevent this deceptive conduct. Without the FTC mandating these contractual provisions, consumers are forced
to rely on the self-regulating nature of social media platforms that “have little
incentive to address this misinformation.” 249

VI. CONCLUSION
The Fyre Festival catastrophe highlighted the grotesque nature of influencer marketing by demonstrating the injustice that results from failed influencer disclosure. With influencer marketing growing rapidly and fraudulent practices becoming rampant, the FTC must save the industry from itself.
Unfortunately, precedent has shown that “voluntary compliance” does not
have the same impact on violators as mandatory compliance. 250 By codifying elements of the Endorsement Guides and other FTC guides into formal
rules, the FTC would hold companies and influencers accountable for the
profits they accrue from the digital marketing method. 251 Moreover, there is
no opportunity for companies or influencers to escape liability where the
FTC requires that each contractual agreement include specific provisions
mandating endorsements reflect the honest opinion of the endorser and disclosures be stated clearly and conspicuously. 252 With the FTC implementing
these two changes, a marketing method built on falsities would become but
a memory in our distant past.

247. See Chopra, supra note 209.
248. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m), 57b (2018).
249. Chopra, supra note 209.
250. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2020).
251. See Davis, supra note 168.
252. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.

